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The discontinuities that humans see in the color spec-
trum are so obvious that there is an inclination for cogni-
tive psychologists to believe them inevitable and, hence, 
to propose that color categories are intrinsic to early levels 
of the neurophysiology that underpins color vision (Berlin 
& Kay, 1969; Franklin, Clifford, Williamson, & Davies, 
2005; Kay & McDaniel, 1978; MacLaury, 1992; Pitchford 
& Mullen, 2002; Ratliff, 1976). However, even though 
color categories require discontinuities in perception, not 
even primary color categories (red, yellow, green, and blue) 
could be derived from any discontinuities in the spectral 
sensitivity of the three cone types by Sperling and Har-
werth (1971) or, as Kay and McDaniel (1978) proposed, 
from the output of opponent process cells (Abramov & 
Gordon, 1994; Webster & Mollon, 1991). So even though 
some current research still stresses the role of precortical 
color processing in the formation of color categories, their 
appearance must be the result of organization at higher 
levels (Abramov & Gordon, 1994; Gegenfurtner & Kiper, 
2003).
With respect to how color categories might be imple-
mented in cortical visual areas, it is known that cells in V1 
may be responsive to quite narrow ranges of wavelength 
and brightness (Yoshioka, Dow, & Vautin, 1996) with 
fairly much the same selectivity higher up at V4 (Schein 
& Desimone, 1990). Some color vision scientists (e.g., 
Hanazawa, Komatsu, & Murakami, 2000; Okajima, Rob-
ertson, & Fielder, 2002; Zeki, 1983) have proposed that 
such cells are the origin of color categories. There would 
seem to be even more reason to site color categories in 
the inferotemporal cortex, for lesions to that area produce 
achromatopsia (Cowey, Heywood, & Irving-Bell, 2001) 
and other (noncolor) disorders of perceptual categorical 
processing (Wilson & DeBauche, 1981). Yet there is no 
evidence for any cells, even in the inferotemporal cortex, 
that have the properties necessary for categorical percep-
tion proposed by Harnad (1987). The argument from cat-
egorical perception should predict, for example, “green” 
cells as being least sensitive to color change in the middle 
of the category and most sensitive to boundary colors 
(e.g., chartreuse or turquoise).
Despite this lack of a neurophysiological underpinning, 
what we shall call the nativist argument gains support 
from the observation, extended by Franklin and Davies 
(2004), that 4-month-old babies show a preference for 
looking at blue stimuli after habituating to green (Born-
stein, Kessen, & Weiskopf, 1976). There are also a few 
studies with nonhuman primates that point to the nativ-
ist position with respect to color categories (Matsuzawa, 
1985; Sandell, Gross, & Bornstein, 1979). There are, how-
ever, concerns about Sandell et al.’s stimuli. In their study, 
cross-and within-category distances were simply equated 
by wavelength differences; these do not take into account 
the spectral sensitivity of the primate eye. Indeed, in every 
contrast, their cross-category contrasts were perceptually 
easier than the within-category contrasts.
Better evidence for the nativist position comes from 
Matsuzawa (1985), who trained a chimpanzee to associ-
ate symbols to human prototypical colors. Although most 
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of the generalization to other colors could be based simply 
on perceptual similarity, there was an exception for green 
that was clearly categorical. Despite the fact that the chim-
panzee was trained on a dark green, she “labeled” light 
greens as green rather than yellow. Nevertheless, these 
categories did not seem well formed in a chimpanzee with 
only 2 years’ experience with color symbols (Matsuno, 
Kawai, & Matsuzawa, 2004).
Data from older children and adults has given rise to 
an alternative, linguistic proposal—which we shall call 
 Whorfian—for the origin of color categories (Davidoff, 
2001; Davidoff, Davies, & Roberson, 1999; Kay & Kemp-
ton, 1984; Roberson, Davidoff, Davies, & Shapiro, 2004, 
2005; Whorf, 1956). Unlike in the pioneering cross-
 linguistic work of Rosch (Rosch Heider & Olivier, 1972), 
the Whorfian studies found that memory and perceived 
(category) similarity were predicted simply by the color 
terms in a speaker’s language. Much of this experimen-
tal work has concentrated on the distinguishing of blue 
and green. Inspection of a subjectively equal color space, 
such as that in the Munsell system, shows that around half 
of the colors come from these two categories. Thus, blue 
and green provide a bigger range of possible within- and 
between-category exemplars. However, no studies have 
expressly tested the Whorfian hypothesis by searching 
for the absence of a blue/green boundary in nonhuman 
primates.
Old-world monkeys such as baboons are known to have 
wavelength discrimination functions similar to those in 
humans (Adams, Bryan, & Jones, 1968; Fobes & King, 
1982), presumably related to the similar spectral absorp-
tion properties of their cone types (Bowmaker, Astell, 
Hunt, & Mollon, 1991). Also, although there is indication 
of somewhat different retinal distributions of short wave 
sensitive cones among primates (Roorda, Metha, Lennie, 
& Williams, 2001), synaptic connectivity, including that 
of baboons, appears to be very similar (Martin, Grünert, 
Chan, & Ghosh, 2001). Given these cross-species simi-
larities, the nativist argument would propose the same 
green and blue categories for baboons as for humans; the 
Whorfian argument clearly would not. 
In the present study, we sought to examine again the 
fundamental issue of whether or not there is a natural 
discontinuity in the human green and blue regions for 
nonhuman primate vision. Rather than teach monkeys the 
range of colors to be labeled green or blue, we simply 
asked whether there might be a natural boundary within 
that range. Thus, in the present study, we examined blue 
and green categories in the simplest procedure inclined 
to produce categorical responding (McKone, Martini, & 
Nakayama, 2001); we then modeled the data to verify the 
underlying category boundaries.
METHOD
Subjects
The subjects were 5 male and 3 female adult Guinea baboons 
(Papio papio) who lived in the same social group at the CNRS INCM 
institute. The baboons were already familiar with the  matching-to-
sample procedure (MTS; Fagot, Wasserman, & Young, 2001) and 
were not food deprived. Five men and 3 women also served as sub-
jects for payment. They all had normal color vision as tested by Ishi-
hara plates (Ishihara, 1998). The adults varied in age from 21 to 37 
years (mean, 25.7 years).
Apparatus
The experiment took place in a darkened room. The baboons were 
tested in an experimental enclosure (60  50  72 cm) facing an 
analog joystick, a metal touch pad, and a 14-in. color monitor driven 
by a Pentium 4 personal computer. On the front of the enclosure 
were a viewing port, a hand port, and a food dispenser delivering 
 banana- flavored food pellets into the enclosure. Manipulation of the 
joystick induced isomorphic displacements of a cursor on the moni-
tor. The monkey viewed the screen through a viewing port, which 
maintained the eye–screen distance at approximately 49 cm.
For the human subjects, the same monitor and joystick were 
placed on a table so that the viewing distance remained approxi-
mately equal to 49 cm. Control and randomization of conditions 
were achieved with programs written in E-Prime 1.0 (Psychology 
Software Tools). Color calibration was achieved as in Roberson and 
Davidoff (2000).
Stimuli
The stimuli were derived from Munsell colors (Munsell, 1905). 
All colors in the present studies had constant brightness (level 5) 
and saturation (level 6). Twelve colors were chosen to be linearly 
spaced (with 2.5 Munsell hue units between adjacent colors), going 
from 2.5G to 10B. The color stimuli subtended 6.4º  6.4º of visual 
angle.
Procedure
In each trial, the baboons placed one hand on the touch pad, which 
produced a .5º circular green cursor along with a white .5º  .5º 
square-shaped stimulus on the screen, located 1.5º above or below 
the cursor. The baboons had to manipulate the joystick to place the 
green dot on the white square to initiate the MTS procedure; then a 
square-shaped sample stimulus appeared with 4.5º of lateral eccen-
tricity on the right or the left of the screen. The sample stimulus was 
displayed for 500 msec and was immediately replaced by a display 
comprising a cursor and two patches of color for comparison with 
the preceding sample. In balanced order, one color square appeared 
on the top half of the screen, and the other on the bottom half. In 
response to the display, baboons had to point with the cursor to the 
comparison stimulus that matched the sample. There was no time 
limit for responding. Response choices and response times were 
recorded. Baboons sometimes received a food pellet inside the en-
closure, in accord with the prevailing reinforcement contingencies.
In training, only 2.5G and 10B stimuli were used as the sample 
and comparison stimuli. Training sessions comprised 96 randomly 
ordered and differentially reinforced identity matching trials, re-
sulting from a completely balanced stimulus identity  stimulus 
position design. Subjects from both species were required to reach a 
criterion level of 80% correct in training trials before being tested.
Experimental test sessions comprised identity (baseline) and 
similarity (probe) MTS trials. In the identity trials, the target was 
identical to one of the comparison stimuli. In the similarity matching 
trials, the target was randomly chosen from the 10 intermediate col-
ors from 5G to 7.5B. For all trials, the color comparison stimuli were 
2.5G and 10B. All possible combinations of stimulus position were 
given equally often in a random order. The 2 stimuli used on identity 
matching trials were each shown 15 times, and the 10 stimuli used 
on similarity matching trials were each shown once, for each com-
bination of sample and comparison stimulus position, resulting in a 
total of 160 trials per session. The proportion of identity and similar-
ity matching trials (3:1) was chosen to maintain subjects’ attention 
during the test. Ten test sessions were required for each subject and 
species. The baboons received a food pellet whenever they gave a 
correct matching response in baseline trials. Independently of re-
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sponses, probe trials were randomly reinforced at an 80% rate. In 
cases of an incorrect baseline response, and for the remaining 20% 
of the probe trials, the baboons received a 3-sec time-out period with 
a black screen. The unique procedural differences for humans, apart 
from verbal instructions and their having to discover the matching 
rule by themselves, was that they were allowed breaks on every oc-
casion after completion of the first three test sessions. 
RESULTS
Training performance varied from one baboon to the 
next. The sessions needed for the MTS rule to be learned 
varied from 4 to 26, but overall, an average of 10 sessions 
was needed for the baboons to reach criterion. One session 
sufficed for all human subjects to learn the rule.
Figure 1 illustrates the percentage of “green” responses 
for probe trials for each species. The frequency of selection 
of the extreme green color (i.e., 2.5G) was considered as 
the dependent variable in a species (human or baboon)  
probe sample color (10 possible colors, from 5G to 7.5B) 
ANOVA. The analysis indicated a significant main effect 
of probe color [F(9,126)  177.9, p  .001], as well as a 
significant probe color  species interaction [F(9,126)  
34.5, p  .001].
There were clearly different response profiles in ba-
boons and humans across the 10 probe stimulus types. 
Curve fitting of the data using polynomial contrasts re-
vealed a highly significant cubic trend  species inter-
action [F(1,14)  137.38, p  .001]. Analysis of each 
species separately showed highly significant cubic trends 
for humans [F(1,7)  170.4, p  .001] and baboons 
[F(1,7)  14.71, p  .006], with these trends having op-
posite curvatures in the two species.
MODELING
Central questions for this research were whether the 
subjects’ categorization behaviors could be characterized 
by a “boundary” between subsets of the probe stimuli, 
and whether human and baboon subjects use boundar-
ies in similar ways. Fortunately, categorization behavior 
has been analyzed using formal decision boundary (DB) 
models (Ashby, 1992) postulating the existence of such 
boundaries. These models have proved extremely success-
ful in capturing human performance on a range of cat-
egory learning tasks (Maddox & Ashby, 1993).
We constructed a hierarchy of simple DB models to 
fit to the probe trial responses made by each subject. The 
models assume that each probe trial stimulus creates a 
perceptual response (denoted pi for the ith probe stimu-
lus, with i ranging from 1 to 10 from the most green probe 
[5G] to the most blue [7.5B]). The perceptual response, pi, 
across repeated presentations of the same probe stimulus, 
is assumed to vary due to perceptual noise; pi is assumed 
to be drawn from a random normal distribution with a 
mean xi and variance σp
2
i. The simplest DB model of the 
present data assumes that the means (x1–x10) are equally 
spaced, consistent with the equal Munsell spacing of the 
probe stimuli. We can arbitrarily set the mean values of 
x1 to x10 to be 1 to 10, because the values are scaled by 
other (noise) parameters in the model. Furthermore, the 
variance of the noise is assumed to be independent of the 
mean and the same for each probe stimulus; it is thus rep-
resented by a single parameter, σp
2.
The DB model proposes that the subject sets a simple 
linear boundary at a particular value within the range of 
perceptual response values created by the probe stimuli. 
The perceptual response value corresponding to this 
boundary is denoted by k. For each probe trial, if the re-
sulting perceptual response is greater than k, then the sub-
ject responds by matching to the blue training stimulus 
(10B); if the perceptual response is less than k, then the 
subject responds by matching to the green training stimu-
lus (2.5G). The same boundary is employed for all probe 
stimuli, but its position varies across trials with zero-mean 
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Figure 1. Response choices (percent of “green” responses) and standard er-
rors for human and baboon subjects.
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Gaussian noise, of variance σb
2. This noise can be collapsed 
together with the perceptual noise term (σp
2) into a single 
overall noise variance parameter, σ2. One estimates the 
probability of green responses produced for each probe 
stimulus from the normal distribution. The probability of 
a green response for probe stimulus i, P(G|i), is given by
 
P i k x
i
( | ) ,G = −⎡⎣ ⎤⎦( )Φ σ  (1)
where Φ(z) is the cumulative distribution function of the 
standard normal distribution. The two-parameter model, 
given by Equation 1, was fit, for each subject individually, 
to the probability of green responses made to each of the 
10 probe stimulus types. Fitting used a constrained itera-
tive routine in MATLAB to obtain maximum likelihood 
estimates of the two parameters (σ2 and k).
We also modeled the data with a more elaborate four-
parameter model. We assumed that subjects adopted two 
boundaries, one closer to the perceptual response elicited 
to the green training stimulus (at perceptual response 
value, kG), and another closer to the blue training stimulus 
(at perceptual response value, kB). If a probe stimulus pro-
duces a perceptual response below kG, then the response 
given is to match to the green training stimulus (2.5G); 
if the perceptual response is above kB, then a match is 
made to the blue training stimulus (10B). A guess is pro-
duced if the perceptual response lies at or between the 
two boundaries. On the guessing trials, the probability of 
matching to 2.5G is given by a parameter, g (0  g  1); 
the probability of matching to 10B is (1  g). Thus, the 
four- parameter model can be written formally as
 
P i g k x
g k x
i
i
( | ) ( )
.
G
G
B
= − ∗ −⎡⎣ ⎤⎦( )
+ ∗ −⎡⎣ ⎤⎦( )
1 Φ
Φ
σ
σ
 
(2)
The characteristic curve produced by the two- parameter 
single-decision-boundary model resembles the mean per-
formance of the human subjects in Figure 1 (convex then 
concave, from left to right). By contrast, the curve pro-
duced by the four-parameter double-decision-boundary 
model resembles the mean performance of the baboons in 
Figure 1 (concave then convex, from left to right). It was 
therefore anticipated that the two-parameter model would 
better be able to account for human performance, whereas 
the four-parameter double-boundary model would better 
be able to account for baboon performance.
The model parameters were constrained in order to 
compare the two models appropriately. First, if g ap-
proaches 0 or 1, then the four-parameter model reduces 
to the two-parameter model (see Equations 1 and 2), so g 
was restricted to the range .2–.8. Second, if the noise pa-
rameters become very large under either model, then the 
curve tends toward linearity and the models become in-
distinguishable from one another. The probe stimuli were 
modeled by mean perceptual response values of 1–10; 
the noise variance parameter, σ2, was constrained to the 
0–10 range (almost all the good fits were achieved with 
values from 1 to 3; see Table 1). Last, the positions of the 
boundaries were restricted: for the two-parameter model, 
the single boundary (k) was constrained to lie somewhere 
from 0 to 11 (i.e., the model values of the mean perceptual 
responses produced by the two training stimuli). For the 
four-parameter model, the green boundary (kG) was con-
strained to lie from 0 to 5.5; the blue boundary (kB) was 
constrained to lie from 5.5 to 11.
Likelihood ratio (LR) test statistics were computed in 
order to compare the fits of the models (for a review of 
this standard method for comparing model fits, see Mad-
dox & Ashby, 1993). The two-parameter model was con-
Table 1
Best-Fitting Models and Parameter Values 
for Individual Human and Baboon Subjects
Better-Fitting
Model (2 or 4
Subject  Parameters)*  k  kB  kG  g  σ
2  LR†  df  p
Human 1 2 (.28) 4.61 – – – 2.30 21.3 8 .0064
Human 2 2 (.95) 5.01 – – – 0.74 3.84 8 .87
Human 3 2 (1.00) 5.34 – – – 4.27 6.34 8 .61
Human 4 2 (.08) 5.32 – – – 1.32 9.09 8 .33
Human 5 2 (1.00) 4.49 – – – 1.56 21.0 8 .0071
Human 6 2 (.45) 5.73 – – – 1.38 6.00 8 .65
Human 7 2 (.67) 6.05 – – – 2.28 21.95 8 .0050
Human 8 2 (.08) 4.69 – – – 1.59 20.89 8 .0074
Baboon 1 4 (.01) – 1.21 9.64 .40 0.74 1.60 6 .95
Baboon 2 4 (.002) – 3.20 9.37 .28 10.00 1.96 6 .92
Baboon 3 4 (.02) – 2.09 8.14 .71 3.01 6.79 6 .34
Baboon 4 4 (1014) – 1.20 10.41 .51 3.13 10.11 6 .12
Baboon 5 4 (1012) – 1.52 10.02 .39 2.89 8.60 6 .20
Baboon 6 4 (.014) – 2.31 8.80 .41 1.56 5.82 6 .44
Baboon 7 4 (1014) – 0.94 9.41 .47 2.13 3.38 6 .76
Baboon 8 4 (.011) – 2.50 10.57 .32 2.99 2.90 6 .82
*The p value given in parentheses is that associated with the likelihood ratio (LR) test com-
paring the two- and four-parameter models ( p  .05 means that the two-parameter model is 
preferred). †The LR statistic compares the better-fitting model with the perfect saturated 
model.
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sidered the better-fitting model when the LR test statistic 
(comparing the two- and four-parameter models) was 
nonsignificant—that is, when its value did not exceed 
the 95th percentile of the χ2 distribution (with degrees of 
freedom equal to the difference in numbers of parameters 
between the two models; df  2 in this case). As a final 
test of fit, the better-fitting model (with either two or four 
parameters) was then compared, via another LR test sta-
tistic, with a perfect saturated model. This saturated model 
used 10 parameters (the observed probabilities of “green” 
responses for each of the 10 probe stimulus types), and 
was (trivially) able to predict the observed probabilities 
perfectly. When this second LR test statistic is nonsignifi-
cant (below the 95th percentile of the χ2 distribution, with 
df  6 or df  8 as appropriate), then the simpler model is 
not significantly worse than the perfect model, and it can 
be deemed an extremely well-fitting model.
Table 1 shows the model-fitting results for each baboon 
and human subject. Clearly, the human data were better fit 
by the two-parameter model than by the four- parameter 
model (8 out of 8 humans); the baboons, by contrast, were 
better fit by the four-parameter model than by the two-
parameter model (8 out of 8 baboons). For 4 of the human 
subjects, even the saturated model was not a better fit than 
the two-parameter model. The baboon data, with the ex-
ception of Baboon 2, were extremely well fit by the four-
parameter model. For Baboon 2, the best- fitting noise pa-
rameter was the maximum allowed (10.0), a much higher 
value than those in any of the other model fits. Such a 
high noise value tends to remove the curvature from the 
curve produced under the model and allows the model 
to fit the data artifactually. However, the fit of the two-
parameter model was significantly worse than that of the 
four- parameter model, and the best-fitting two-parameter 
model was also obtained with the maximum noise param-
eter of 10.0. For this subject, it seems that neither model 
truly captured the data. For the remaining 7 baboons, the 
fit was excellent; in all cases, the fit of the four-parameter 
model was not significantly inferior to that of the satu-
rated model (which captured the data exactly). For all of 
the human subjects, the single boundary was close to the 
midpoint of the probe stimuli used (range 4.49–6.05; mid-
point, 5.5).
DISCUSSION
A new approach was adopted to investigate the con-
troversial issue of the origin of color categories. The data 
were remarkably clear-cut. Both humans and baboons 
performed well at the task, but the humans matched our 
stimuli as if with a sharp blue/green boundary. None of 
the baboons, despite good color discrimination, showed 
any inclination to match to a single boundary but rather 
responded as if with two boundaries that varied among 
individuals but that were relatively close to the training 
stimuli. It is true that the baboons took considerably lon-
ger than the humans to learn the training stimuli to crite-
rion. However, it is very unlikely that more training would 
have allowed the baboon and human data on probe trials to 
converge, because the curve fitting showed qualitatively 
distinct patterns of performance. As a means of simulat-
ing performance at an earlier stage of learning or task 
competence, we can take the best-fitting human model 
parameters and increase the noise for each subject. This 
simply linearizes the curvature; it does not produce the 
significant curvature in the opposite direction that was ob-
served in the baboons’ performance. Instead, it would ap-
pear that baboons, like patients who have lost color names 
(Goldstein, 1948; Roberson, Davidoff, & Braisby, 1999), 
base categorization decisions solely on close perceptual 
similarity (and guess when the test stimulus is not percep-
tually similar to either training item).
The baboons have been trained over 15 years to catego-
rize many types of stimuli using a similar MTS procedure. 
So, why is the task with colors so different for them? Other 
tasks allow the baboons to categorize, with sufficient train-
ing, on the basis of small perceptual differences (see, e.g., 
Vauclair & Fagot, 1996), but this approach would be inef-
fective with the continuous gradation of colors used here, 
or indeed, with any other stimulus continuum. At some 
point on the continuum, a boundary has to be drawn and 
the positioning of that boundary will be arbitrary without 
neurophysiological or nonperceptual mechanisms to aid 
categorization. Indeed, it can be argued (Dummett, 1975; 
Roberson et al., 1999) that the task is impossible without 
a nonperceptual procedure to aid in the boundary deci-
sion; this is shown by the modeling data, where baboons 
guessed during probe testing except for stimuli close to 
the training items. In addition, the model, with its assump-
tions, is able to predict the individual baboon’s behavior 
to an extent that is statistically indistinguishable from a 
perfect-fitting model (see Table 1, rightmost column; all 
ps  .05 and mostly .05). So, on grounds of parsimony 
one would probably want to accept our model rather than 
propose additional possible factors affecting the percep-
tual processing of the probe stimuli differentially in the 
two species. Humans, by contrast, matched a probe stimu-
lus further away from the training items in a systematic 
way (i.e., without guessing), even though this item was 
perceived to be distinct from the training item to which it 
was matched. Such behavior is consistent with the use of 
linguistic labels to aid in categorization.
The data therefore give no support whatsoever to the 
nativist claim that the same monkey and human color 
categories are explicitly instantiated in the primate color 
vision system. Of course, it is always possible that our de-
sign produced in baboons conditions that allowed them to 
ignore their innate boundary. It is admitted that our rejec-
tion of the nativist claim is based on data from only one of 
the many possible equally spaced sets of stimuli that go 
from green to blue and without manipulation of reward 
contingencies. However, it is entirely unclear what kind of 
differences between baboon and human perception of our 
stimuli or what change in reward contingencies would pro-
duce the precise shape of function shown by the baboons. 
Of course, it is possible that baboons, like chimpanzees, 
could be taught color categories by associating colors to a 
sign (Matsuzawa, 1985), but that is a different matter.
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